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CURRENT DECISIONS

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—FEES—STATUTORY REGULATION.—The Workmen's Compensation Act provided that claims for legal services arising under that statute were enforceable only if approved by the Commission. The respondent, an attorney, entered into a contract with his client's brother whereby the latter was to pay him fifty *per cent.* of the amount awarded the client by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted by the bar association against the respondent. *Held*, that it is contrary to legal ethics for attorneys to charge fees of greater amount than that fixed by the Compensation Commissioner. *Matter of Fisch* (1919, N. Y.) 61 N. Y. L. J. 1234.

Generally it is not illegal or against public policy for a lawyer to prosecute an action on a contingent fee basis. See *Stevens v. Sheriff* (1907) 76 Kan. 124, 127, 90 Pac. 799, 800. However, it was the purpose and intent of the Compensation Act to prevent this in order to insure the injured workman as large a return as possible. It is therefore submitted that the court properly squelched this attempt to indirectly evade the beneficent objects contemplated by this legislation. For a discussion of the duties of attorneys, see (1911) 21 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 72.

CARRIERS—CARMACK AMENDMENT—PRESUMPTION AGAINST TERMINAL CARRIER.—In an action against the terminal carrier to recover damages for injury to goods, the plaintiff introduced evidence to show that the goods were delivered in good condition to the initial carrier and were received from the defendant in a damaged condition. The defendant contended that since the passage of the Carmack Amendment this did not make a *prima facie* case. *Held*, that the plaintiff had made a *prima facie* case, as the common-law presumption against the terminal carrier was not superseded by the Carmack Amendment. *Central of Georgia Ry. v. Scrivens* (1919, Ga. Ct. App.) 100 S. E. 233.

It is settled law that the Carmack Amendment did not deprive the shipper of his right of action against the connecting carrier, but merely gave an additional remedy against the initial carrier when the goods were taken on a "through" bill of lading. *Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Blish Co.* (1915) 241 U. S. 190, 36 Sup. Ct. 541. And so it did not affect the common-law presumption involved in the principal case, against the terminal carrier. *Erisman v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R.* (1917) 180 Iowa, 759, 163 N. W. 627. For a discussion of the liability of carriers under the Carmack Amendment, see Daish, *Liability of Common Carriers under the Act to Regulate Commerce* (1916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 341.

CONFLICT OF LAWS—LAPSING OF LEGACIES—"RENOI."—One T, a citizen of the United States, whose domicile of origin was in New York, died in France, where he had acquired a domicile. He left a will in which he bequeathed his residuary estate in equal parts to an aunt and a cousin. The cousin having died before T, her share would accrue to the aunt under French law, while it would lapse under the law of New York and go to the testator's brother. The latter opposed the proposed distribution, contending that the law of the domicile (sec. 47, Decedent Estate Law) in accordance with which the New York courts would determine the